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RESURRECTING A DOCTRINE ON ITS
DEATHBED: REVISITING FEDERAL COMMON
LAW GREENHOUSE GAS LITIGATION AFTER
UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP V. EPA
ZACHARY HENNESSEE†
ABSTRACT
This Note considers how the Supreme Court’s decision in Utility
Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (UARG) may have created a new
opening for federal common law nuisance litigation as a means to
address climate change. The Court’s earlier decision in American
Electric Power v. Connecticut (AEP) held that federal nuisance claims
targeting greenhouse gas emissions were completely displaced by the
Clean Air Act. However, the holding in AEP was premised on the
assumption that the Clean Air Act uniformly addressed greenhouse
gases throughout the statute. UARG upended this assumption, holding
that there are sections of the Clean Air Act that do not encompass
greenhouse gases. Therefore, there may be sources of greenhouse gas
emissions that are not regulated by the statute. Based on the
displacement analysis employed in AEP, this would mean that the
federal common law of nuisance would not be displaced as to these
sources.
The Clean Air Act’s coverage of the greenhouse gas emissions from
one important category of sources—existing stationary sources—is an
open question. Until recently, the D.C. Circuit appeared poised to
answer at least part of this question in West Virginia v. EPA, the case
challenging the Obama administration’s signature carbon dioxide
regulation—the Clean Power Plan. The Clean Power Plan was
premised on Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, and the D.C. Circuit’s
en banc decision would have resolved whether and to what extent
Section 111(d) can be used to regulate certain existing sources’
greenhouse gas emissions. However, the Trump administration has
proposed to rescind the regulation, and it appears increasingly unlikely
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that the D.C. Circuit will issue a decision on the merits of the litigation.
Therefore, it remains unclear whether Section 111(d) addresses existing
sources’ greenhouse gas emissions. As this Note shows, the only other
section of the Clean Air Act that might encompass these sources’
greenhouse gas emissions is Section 115, but this is far from certain.
This Note argues that a federal common law nuisance suit should be
leveraged in the face of this uncertainty. The result would be salutary,
win or lose. On the one hand, the suit could result in a holding that
either Section 111(d) or Section 115 encompasses greenhouse gases,
which would mean that the federal common law would indeed be
displaced. This holding could then be used to force the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate existing sources’ greenhouse gas
emissions under those sections. On the other hand, if the court finds
that the Clean Air Act does not address existing sources’ greenhouse
gas emissions, then these sources would be subject to substantial
litigation risk. This exposure, in turn, could induce these sources to ask
Congress to draft legislation that addresses their greenhouse gas
emissions, thereby displacing any future common law claims. In the
end, the desired outcome of the federal nuisance suit is the same: to
catalyze comprehensive regulatory or legislative coverage of
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States, which is imperative to
avert the most devastating effects of climate change.

INTRODUCTION
In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP),1 eight
states, New York City, and three nonprofit land trusts sued the five
largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the United States—electric power
plants which, at the time of the suit, emitted 2.5 percent of humanity’s
total annual carbon pollution.2 The plaintiffs alleged, among other
things, that the defendants’ contribution to global warming constituted
a public nuisance under federal common law.3 The Second Circuit
agreed with the plaintiffs,4 but the Supreme Court reversed. Finding
that the Clean Air Act Section 111(d)5 provides “a means to seek limits
1. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
2. Id. at 418.
3. Id. A public nuisance is a “substantial and unreasonable interference with public rights.”
Id. Despite the familiar holding in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the federal
common law—as distinct from the general common law—continues to exist, primarily around
interstate issues where no single state’s law would apply. See infra Part I.A.
4. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
5. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 111(d), 77 Stat. 392, 84 Stat. 1684 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 7411(d)). For a discussion of this provision of the Clean Air Act, see infra Part I.B.
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on emissions of carbon dioxide from domestic powerplants,” the Court
held that the Clean Air Act displaced the plaintiffs’ “parallel” federal
common law claim.6
Industry groups and their counsel embraced the decision,
declaring that “[t]he federal common law of public nuisance [has] died
after a long illness” and that the doctrine is an “extinct tort.”7
Commentators and scholars broadly agreed, concluding that “the
decision in AEP has completely foreclosed any avenue to enjoin any
type of air pollution under the federal common law of nuisance.”8
Climate change plaintiffs too have abandoned the tort.9 Nevertheless,
this Note contends that this use of the federal common law has been
laid to rest prematurely.10 Industry’s success at limiting the Clean Air
Act’s coverage of greenhouse gases has already injected glimmers of
life into the doctrine, and the doctrine stands to come surging back if
ongoing efforts to limit the Clean Air Act’s coverage of greenhouse
gases are successful.
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in one industry victory—
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (UARG)11—may have laid the
grounds for the doctrine’s resurrection. In UARG, a clandestine
6. AEP, 564 U.S. at 425. The plaintiffs in AEP were only seeking injunctive relief, but the
Ninth Circuit subsequently clarified that the Clean Air Act also displaces federal nuisance claims
for damages. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2390 (2013).
7. The Death of Environmental Common Law?, MCGUIREWOODS (Oct. 3, 2012),
https://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/Alerts/2012/10/Death-EnvironmentalCommon-Law.aspx [https://perma.cc/RTU6-Y734]; see also Keith Goldberg, No Future for
Climate Change Torts, Attys Say, LAW360 (May 23, 2013, 6:25 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/444225/no-future-for-climate-change-torts-attys-say
[https://perma.cc/5FD3-UE4S]
(noting that “AEP laid down the gauntlet—the [Clean Air Act] is one-stop shopping for questions
under climate change” (emphasis added)).
8. Damian M. Brychcy, Note, American Electric Power v. Connecticut: Disaster Averted by
Displacing the Federal Common Law of Nuisance, 46 GA. L. REV. 459, 486 (2012); see also R.
Trent Taylor, The Obsolescence of Environmental Common Law, 40 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 1,
1 (2013) (finding that federal climate change litigation is “on the verge of obsolescence”); David
R. Brody, Case Comment, American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 297, 302 (2012) (declaring that environmental claims under federal common law are
“[m]ostly [d]ead”).
9. See Juscelino F. Colares & Kosta Ristovski, Pleading Patterns and the Role of Litigation
as a Driver of Federal Climate Change Legislation, 54 JURIMETRICS 329, 333 (2014) (noting that
there have been only four federal nuisance claims around climate change and only one since
AEP).
10. As Mark Twain once quipped after discovering that a newspaper had prematurely
published his obituary, “[t]he reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated.” PETER
MESSENT, THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO MARK TWAIN 22 (2007).
11. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
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collective of electric utilities and trade groups12 challenged efforts of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to require certain
stationary sources of greenhouse gases to obtain permits and install
pollution control technology under the Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) and Title V requirements of the Clean Air Act.13
UARG held that, even though the Clean Air Act has one act-wide
definition of “air pollutant,” the statute does not uniformly treat
greenhouse gases as air pollutants throughout each of its sections.14
Thus, the Court found that the EPA “may not treat greenhouse gases
as a pollutant” for the purpose of determining whether a source may
be subject to PSD and Title V requirements.15
UARG’s holding undermined a basic assumption of AEP—that
the Clean Air Act comprehensively addressed greenhouse gases16—
and has therefore created a potential opening for federal nuisance
claims. Ultimately, however, a federal nuisance suit would be viable
only if no section of the Clean Air Act is found to provide a basis to
regulate the defendant’s greenhouse gas emissions, and many of the
Clean Air Act’s sections have not yet been tested in the courts.17 Until
recently, the D.C. Circuit appeared poised to resolve at least part of
this question in West Virginia v. EPA,18 the case challenging the EPA’s
landmark carbon dioxide regulation—the Clean Power Plan.19 The
Clean Power Plan was premised on Section 111(d) of the Clean Air
Act, and the D.C. Circuit’s en banc decision would have resolved
whether and to what extent that section can be used to regulate
greenhouse gases from existing sources. However, the Trump

12. See John Walke, Is Your Power Company Fighting in Court Against Safeguards from
Mercury and Toxic Air Pollution?, NRDC: EXPERT BLOG (May 25, 2012), https://www.nrdc.org/
experts/john-walke/your-power-company-fighting-court-against-safeguards-mercury-and-toxicair [https://perma.cc/ZQ5M-2TKY] (noting that UARG has no online presence but that it
appears to be linked with a Washington, D.C. law firm and has “no obvious independence” from
the firm). Walke wondered “whether one reason for UARG’s creation was to shield the names
of member companies from general public awareness when UARG advocates for dirtier results
on the companies’ behalf.” Id.
13. For a primer on these provisions of the Clean Air Act, see infra Part I.B.
14. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2449.
15. Id.
16. For a discussion of this assumption, see infra Part III.A.
17. For a discussion of each section of the Clean Air Act that might be used to regulate
greenhouse gases, see infra Part III.B.
18. West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. argued Sept. 27, 2016).
19. See id.; see also Clean Power Plan Case Resources, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.
org/climate/clean-power-plan-case-resources [http://perma.cc/MFV3-32MR] (documenting the
ongoing litigation in West Virginia v. EPA).
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administration has issued a proposal to repeal the regulation,20 and it
appears increasingly unlikely that the court will issue a decision on the
merits.21 Therefore, it remains unclear whether or to what extent
Section 111(d) addresses existing sources’ greenhouse gas emissions.
As this Note demonstrates, the only other section that might credibly
be used to regulate existing sources’ greenhouse gas emissions is
Section 115, but it has never been tested in the courts.
A federal nuisance suit should be leveraged in the face of this
uncertainty. On the one hand, a federal nuisance suit could force the
courts to clarify that sections of the Clean Air Act do indeed provide
for the regulation of greenhouse gases from specific sources, in which
case the federal common law would be displaced. And this finding
could be used to force the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases under
those sections.22 Regulations issued under these sections could provide
for effective and efficient mechanisms to address climate change.
On the other hand, if a court finds that no section of the Clean Air
Act provides for the regulation of a given source’s greenhouse gas
emissions, a federal nuisance suit could be leveraged to provide widereaching remedies to states, and possibly to others,23 injured by that
source’s emissions. Although these remedies could probably not avert
climate change significantly,24 they could pose vast litigation risks and
regulatory uncertainty for heavily polluting fossil fuel-reliant
industries. These substantial liabilities could persuade industry
actors—many of whom have stridently argued that the Clean Air Act
does not address greenhouse gases—to warm to national legislation

20. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48035 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
21. For a discussion of the Clean Power Plan litigation, see infra Part III.B.2.
22. For a discussion of how clarifying that certain sections of the Clean Air Act address
greenhouse gases could force the EPA to regulate under those sections, see infra Part IV.
23. The Supreme Court has never indicated whether private citizens or political subdivisions
of states may assert federal nuisance claims. AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 422 (2011). Therefore, while this
Note is primarily addressed to states impacted by climate change, the argument here intentionally
leaves open the possibility that others might assert these claims too.
24. It should be noted that a court’s inability to issue a remedy that would fully stem the tides
of climate change would not be an insurmountable bar to standing. See Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007) (“[A] plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement when he shows
that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury to himself. He need not show that a
favorable decision will relieve his every injury.” (alteration in original) (quoting Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 n.15 (1982))).
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that does comprehensively address these pollutants, thereby displacing
federal nuisance suits.25
In either case, the desired outcome of a federal nuisance suit
would be the same: to catalyze comprehensive regulatory coverage of
greenhouse gases in the United States.26 This is critical. Global
temperatures are rapidly increasing toward a “tipping point,” above
which climate change and the associated environmental, social, and
political upheavals are projected to become increasingly catastrophic
and self-reinforcing.27 Yet Congress has not made any significant
efforts to address climate change since the Waxman-Markey Bill failed
in 2009,28 and it is unlikely to do so in the near future. And the current
administration has aggressively sought to withdraw Obama-era climate
policies, and has reneged on the U.S. commitment to the 2015 Paris
Climate Agreement.29 Still, national-level action is ever more critical to

25. See Colares & Ristovski, supra note 9, at 332 (suggesting that the “imposition of variable,
potentially inconsistent and more costly litigation outcomes [could induce] industry to seek
preemptive federal legislation to reign in such costs”).
26. However, given the current political climate, Congress could also pass a bill that
expressly eviscerates the federal common law and the Clean Air Act, leaving no opportunities to
target greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, as a tactical matter, litigants should delay bringing
federal nuisance claims until there is a more pro-environmental administration.
27. We have already warmed the earth by more than one degree Celsius above preindustrial
levels, more than halfway to the two-degree threshold that scientists have identified as the
maximum degree of warming the earth can tolerate before the climate reaches a “tipping point.”
Climate Change, NASA, http://climate.nasa.gov/evidence [https://perma.cc/622G-2NF5]. Past this
point, the warming effects will become self-perpetuating: as more polar ice melts, more global
warming gases will be released and more dark surfaces will be exposed, causing places like
Greenland to absorb more heat than they reflect—like giant asphalt parking lots. John Carey, Is
Global Warming Happening Faster than Expected?, SCI. AM. (Nov. 1, 2012),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/is-global-warming-happening-faster-than-expected
[https://perma.cc/R4VE-U9WK]. Weather changes will cause extreme droughts across much of
the equator, increasingly intense wildfires, and much more devastating storms. Global Warming
Impacts, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/our-work/globalwarming/science-and-impacts/global-warming-impacts#.WFToIZJOkp8 [https://perma.cc/CA97YNN8]. Global food production and water availability will be severely disrupted, id., leading to
mass population upheaval. John Vidal, Global Warming Could Create 150 Million ‘Climate
Refugees’ By 2050, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 2, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2009/nov/03/global-warming-climate-refugees [https://perma.cc/24ER-8SAW].
28. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
29. Climate Deregulation Tracker, SABINE CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., http://
columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/climate-deregulation-tracker [https://perma.cc/99P8-8W2T].
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averting the most devastating impacts of climate change,30 and the
federal common law may be a wedge to push policies in this direction.31
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews the federal
common law and displacement doctrines and discusses the relevant
case law pertaining to the displacement of federal nuisance suits
involving greenhouse gases. Part II analyzes the displacement test used
in AEP and concludes that AEP and its progeny demonstrate that the
Clean Air Act must provide a “sufficient”32 regulatory framework to
displace a nuisance claim against a given source’s greenhouse gas
emissions. Part III argues that because UARG demonstrates that the
Clean Air Act does not comprehensively address greenhouse gases, it
cannot be assumed that the Clean Air Act automatically provides a
“sufficient” framework to regulate all stationary sources’ greenhouse
gases.33 Because the Clean Air Act contains multiple regulatory
30. The world is currently emitting about thirty-six billion tons of carbon dioxide per year,
and the United States is the second largest emitter. CO2 Time Series 1990–2014 per
Region/Country, EMISSIONS DATABASE FOR GLOB. ATMOSPHERIC RES., http://edgar.
jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php?v=CO2ts1990-2014&sort=des9 [https://perma.cc/8RCG-MXNJ].
At the current rate of emissions, scientists project that we will exceed the two-degree Celsius
threshold as early as 2050. Global Warming Set To Pass 2C Threshold in 2050: Report, PHY.ORG
(Sept. 29, 2016), https://phys.org/news/2016-09-global-2c-threshold.html [https://perma.cc/
QW5W-P24P].
31. Other climate litigation strategies, though important, may not be sufficient to deal with
an interstate—and international—issue like climate change. For instance, state common law,
unlike federal common law, requires a “clear and manifest” congressional purpose before federal
legislation can preempt it. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981).
However, the strategy of using state common law to target interstate pollution suffers from
several defects, namely that it is dependent on the laws of the source state (where the pollution
originates), not the receptor state. Source states may be more permissive of pollution and may
even prohibit receptor states from suing on behalf of their citizens. See, e.g., North Carolina v.
Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 309 n.2 (4th Cir. 2010) (observing that Alabama and Tennessee
law may not permit North Carolina to bring a nuisance suit on behalf of its citizens).
Another climate litigation strategy, based on the doctrines of due process and the public
trust, has had traction in the District Court of Oregon. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d.
1224 (D. Or. 2016), motion to certify appeal denied, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705 (D.
Or. June 8, 2017). The Juliana plaintiffs—including a group of young people between the ages of
eight and nineteen—have asserted that the United States government’s contributions to climate
change have infringed on the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights to a sustainable climate system and
violated the government’s fiduciary duties to protect the nation’s natural resources for the benefit
of its present and future citizens. Id. at 1233, 1239, 1254. Although this strategy is intriguing, it is
relatively untested and is far from a slam dunk. Therefore, it should be pursued in tandem with
federal nuisance litigation, not to its exclusion.
32. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corp of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 777 (7th Cir. 2011).
33. This Note only discuses stationary sources of greenhouse gases because the Clean Air
Act apparently does permit the regulation of mobile sources’ greenhouse gas emissions. See
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007) (holding that the Clean Air Act permits the EPA
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles).
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authorities, this Part undertakes a section-by-section analysis of which
provisions might allow for the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions.
It concludes that the Clean Air Act’s coverage of greenhouse gas
emissions from existing stationary sources is uncertain and argues that
federal nuisance suits may be viable against these types of sources. Part
IV then argues that climate litigants should leverage federal nuisance
claims in the face of this uncertainty to force more comprehensive
statutory or regulatory coverage of greenhouse gases.
I. BACKGROUND
This Part provides an overview of the federal common law of
nuisance, the displacement doctrine, and the relevant case law and
statutory background concerning the displacement of greenhouse gas
federal nuisance claims. It also provides a primer on the sections of the
Clean Air Act that are relevant for the purposes of this Note.
A. The Federal Common Law of Nuisance and Its Statutory
Displacement
1. Historical Roots of Federal Common Law of Nuisance. Despite
the familiar admonition in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins34 that
“[t]here is no federal general common law,”35 it is “well accepted that
the federal courts retain common lawmaking powers in particular
areas.”36 Federal common law has historically been fashioned around
interstate issues where resort to an individual state’s laws would be
inappropriate to resolve the problem.37 Interstate environmental
pollution is one area in which federal courts have traditionally retained
their common law authority to fill “‘statutory interstices’ and, if
necessary, even ‘fashion federal law.’”38
Federal common law environmental litigation has predominantly
involved claims of public nuisance, which the Restatement (Second) of
Torts defines as an “unreasonable interference with a right common to

34. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
35. Id. at 78.
36. Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1639, 1640 (2008). See generally Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964) (advocating for federal common law despite Erie).
37. See Dan Mensher, Note, Common Law on Ice: Using Federal Judge-Made Nuisance Law
To Address the Interstate Effects of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 ENVTL. L. REV. 463, 467 (2007)
(discussing how and why courts fashion federal common law).
38. AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 421 (2011) (quoting Friendly, supra note 36, at 421–22).
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the general public.”39 Courts commonly reference the Restatement’s
definition when considering cases arising under the federal law.40
Public nuisance claims are typically brought by states against other
governments or private parties to vindicate their own interests or those
of their citizens and usually involve “significant interference with
public health, safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.”41
Federal common law nuisance litigation has a pedigree dating
back to the early twentieth century,42 but the seminal modern federal
nuisance case—and the doctrine’s apex—is Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee (Milwaukee I).43 In that case, the State of Illinois was
seeking injunctive relief against the City of Milwaukee and other
Wisconsin cities, which it alleged were discharging two hundred million
gallons of raw or undertreated sewage per day into Lake Michigan in
violation of Illinois law.44 Though the Court declined to exercise
original jurisdiction over the matter,45 it nevertheless affirmed that
“[w]hen we deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate
aspects, there is a federal common law.”46 The Court acknowledged
that Congress had addressed the matter of interstate water pollution in
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA),47 but declared
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
40. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Asian Carp Case), 667 F.3d 765, 780 (7th Cir.
2011).
41. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 758 F.3d 892, 900 (7th Cir. 2014).
42. Robert V. Percival, The Frictions of Federalism: The Rise and Fall of the Federal
Common Law of Interstate Nuisance 2–3 (Univ. of Md., Pub-Law Research Paper No. 2003-02,
2003), https://ssrn.com/abstract=452922 [https://perma.cc/B9F8-BPMN]. The original federal
nuisance case concerning interstate air pollution was Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S.
230 (1907) in which the Attorney General of Georgia sought and received an injunction enjoining
a copper smelter in Tennessee from emitting sulfur gases. Id. at 236–37. Courts continued to
develop the federal common law of interstate nuisance after Erie. See James D. Lawlor,
Annotation, Federal Common Law of Nuisances as Basis for Relief in Environmental Pollution
Cases, 29 A.L.R. Fed. 137 (1976) (“A number of cases, decided both before and after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Erie R. Co. v Tompkins support the proposition that a federal common-law
nuisance action exists in environmental pollution cases.” (citation omitted)). The earliest modern
iteration of the federal common law of interstate nuisance was Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236
(10th Cir. 1971) where the State of Texas sought to enjoin New Mexican farmers’ use of
chlorinated pesticides that were allegedly harming surface waters in Texas. Id. at 237–38. The
Pankey court also held that federal district courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate claims of federal
common law nuisance. Id. at 242.
43. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
44. Id. at 93.
45. Id. at 99. The Court found that original jurisdiction was inappropriate because of the
availability of lower court action. Id.
46. Id. at 103.
47. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).
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that “[t]he remedy sought by Illinois is not within the precise scope of
remedies prescribed by Congress”48 and that “[u]ntil the field has been
made the subject of comprehensive legislation or authorized
administrative standards, only a federal common law basis can provide
an adequate means for dealing with such claims as alleged federal
rights.”49 But the Court presciently noted that “new federal laws and
new federal regulations may in time [displace] the field of federal
common law of nuisance.”50
2. Displacement of Federal Common Law Nuisance Claims.
Displacement occurs when federal legislation abrogates the federal
common law. The test for whether a federal statute displaces federal
common law is not as demanding as the test for whether it “preempts”51
state law,52 but if Congress is legislating against a backdrop of “longestablished and familiar principles” of federal common law, it “does
not write upon a clean slate.”53 Rather, “courts may take it as a given
that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the [federal
common law] principle will apply except ‘when a statutory purpose to
the contrary is evident.’”54 Thus, preexisting federal common law is
displaced only if it is evident that Congress intended to displace the
common law, either expressly or implicitly.55
A federal statute may implicitly displace the federal common law
through either “field displacement” or “conflict displacement.”56 Field
displacement occurs when a statute comprehensively “occupies the

48. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 103.
49. Id. at 107 n.9.
50. Id. at 107.
51. Displacement and preemption are distinct concepts but are often conflated in the
literature. Displacement refers to the federal statutory abrogation of federal common law,
whereas preemption involves the federal abrogation of state law.
52. See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (noting that a court will only find that a federal
statute preempts traditional state law if it discerns a “clear and manifest purpose” of Congress to
do so (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
53. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (first quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson,
343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952); then quoting Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104,
108 (1991)).
54. Id. (quoting Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n., 501 U.S. at 108).
55. Id. (“In order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must ‘speak directly’ to
the question addressed by the common law.” (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S.
618, 625 (1978))).
56. Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293,
311 (2005).
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field,” leaving no room for the common law claim.57 Under the field
displacement theory, a comprehensive statute that is silent on an issue
might still displace the common law, given that Congress may have
intended to exempt the subject from regulation and common law
claims.58 Conflict displacement, on the other hand, occurs when the
statute conflicts with the common law, providing a “distinctly different
remedy than would be available under the federal common law.”59
Scholars have disagreed about whether the courts have applied field or
conflict displacement analyses in determining whether federal
nuisance claims are displaced by environmental laws.60
The leading case on federal common law displacement, until AEP,
was City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II).61 The case was based
on the same controversy in Milwaukee I, which had worked its way
through the lower courts back to the Supreme Court. Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the newly revised
FWPCA—now known as the Clean Water Act62—displaced federal
common law nuisance suits for interstate point source water
57. Id.
58. Id. at 313. For example, in the state law preemption context (the case law on preemption
is much more developed than the displacement literature, and, though they have different
standards, they also share many similarities), the Supreme Court has found that federal alien
registration law completely preempts state laws on the matter, even when the state laws
complement the federal law, because the federal statute “was designed as a ‘harmonious whole’”
which reflected Congress’s intent to foreclose any regulation in the area. Arizona v. United States,
567 U.S. 387, 401–03 (2012) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 72 (1941)).
59. Merrill, supra note 56, at 311–12. One example—again in the context of state law
preemption—is Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) which held that a
state law barring state entities from transacting with Burma was preempted because it directly
conflicted with a federal statute that gave the President sole discretion to control economic
sanctions against the country, and it penalized individuals and conduct that Congress expressly
exempted from sanctions. Id. at 374–76, 378.
60. See, e.g., Van Fischer, Climate Change and Federal Common Law Nuisance: Time for
Displacement, 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 471, 479 (2011) (advocating for field displacement theory);
Merrill, supra note 56, at 311 (noting that “Milwaukee II is ambiguous as to what the standard for
displacement of federal common law should be”); P. Leigh Bausinger, Note, Welcome to the
(Impenetrable) Jungle: Massachusetts v. EPA, the Clean Air Act, and the Common Law of Public
Nuisance, 53 VILL. L. REV. 527, 533 n.36 (2008) (discussing the confusion in this area and
attributing it in part to the loose distinction between preemption and displacement); Mensher,
supra note 37, at 467 (advocating for a conflict displacement theory); Sarah Olinger, Note, Filling
the Void in an Otherwise Occupied Field: Using Federal Common Law To Regulate Carbon
Dioxide in the Absence of a Preemptive Statute, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 250 (2007)
(suggesting that Milwaukee II is “[a] classic example of field [displacement]”).
61. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
62. The FWPCA was thoroughly overhauled in 1972, shortly after Milwaukee I, and has not
changed significantly since. See History of the Clean Water Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/lawsregulations/history-clean-water-act [https://perma.cc/6YM2-FC2E].
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pollution.63 The Court found that the statute was a “comprehensive
regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative agency”
under which “[e]very point source discharge is prohibited unless
covered by a permit.”64 Because the only issue was “whether the field
has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular
manner,”65 the Court found that the Clean Water Act spoke “directly
to [the] question” at hand, leaving no room for the federal common law
of nuisance.66
Before turning to how the Clean Air Act has been said to displace
federal common law claims involving greenhouse gases, a more
nuanced understanding of the mechanisms of the Clean Air Act is
necessary.
B. Primer on the Clean Air Act
Adopted in its contemporary form in 1970, the Clean Air Act was
intended to protect the public from air pollution caused by various
sources broadly categorized as either mobile or stationary. The statute
is often cited as the archetype of cooperative federalism, where the
delegation of authority to set regulatory standards and enforce them is
split between the EPA and the states.67 The statute contains different,
overlapping frameworks for addressing air pollution, and any given
source or pollutant could potentially be regulated under multiple
sections of the Clean Air Act. This Section provides an “aerial” view
of the Clean Air Act’s sections and mechanisms that are relevant for
the purposes of this Note.
The linchpins of the Clean Air Act are the “national ambient air
quality standards” (NAAQS), which are ambient standards that apply
to “criteria pollutants” emitted by diverse sources. Under Section 108,
the EPA has significant discretion to identify and list criteria
pollutants,68 but once it does, it must set maximum permissible ambient

63. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 332.
64. Id. at 317–18 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
65. Id. at 324.
66. Id. at 315. Two months later, in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), the Supreme Court went one step further, declaring “that the
federal common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more
comprehensive scope of the [CWA].” Id. at 22.
67. John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183,
1197–99 (1995).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2018). Different sections of the Clean Air Act are generally referred
to as they appear in the Clean Air Act itself, as opposed to the corresponding provisions of the
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levels—NAAQS—for each pollutant under Section 109.69 The EPA
has only listed NAAQS for six pollutants—carbon monoxide, lead,
nitrogen dioxide, ozone, particulate matter, and sulfur dioxide.70
Once the EPA sets the NAAQS, states must submit “[s]tate
implementation plans” that ensure compliance with the NAAQS for
each criteria pollutant.71 These plans are flexible and apply to both
mobile and stationary sources of pollutants. If the state does not submit
a state implementation plan or the plan is deficient, the EPA can
promulgate a “[f]ederal implementation plan” instead.72 There are also
various mechanisms to prevent one state from interfering with another
state’s compliance with the NAAQS.73
Once the EPA promulgates a NAAQS for a criteria pollutant,
states must determine whether they comply with the ambient standard.
Areas within a state that comply are considered attainment areas, and
those that do not are designated nonattainment areas.74 To keep
attainment areas from getting dirtier, the Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) program in Sections 160–169 of the Clean Air Act
requires new and modified major stationary sources of “any air
pollutant”75 in those areas to obtain permits and install the “best
available control technology” (BACT) for their emissions. The BACT
is set on a source-by-source basis.76
For nonattainment areas, under the Clean Air Act Sections 171–
193, new and modified major sources must install control technology
to meet the “lowest achievable emission rate.”77 In addition, both new
and existing sources must use “reasonably available control
technology” to reduce their emissions.78

United States Code. For a list of the conversions between the Clean Air Act and the Code
sections, see Clean Air Act Overview, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/clean-airact-text [https://perma.cc/3ZU4-EGSB].
69. 42 U.S.C. § 7409.
70. Criteria Air Pollutants, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants [https://perma.
cc/4PJ7-LVYK].
71. 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
72. Id.
73. E.g. id. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i) (SIP challenges); id. § 7426(b) (petitions to the EPA); id. §
7410(k)(5) (SIP calls).
74. Id. § 7407(d).
75. The definition of air pollution here is the issue in UARG. For a discussion of the Court’s
interpretation in UARG, see infra Part I.C.3.
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470–7492.
77. Id. §§ 7501–7515.
78. Id.
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Apart from the NAAQS process, the Clean Air Act contains
various authorities that set emission standards for stationary sources of
air pollutants without reference to an area’s attainment or
nonattainment status. For instance, under Section 111, the EPA sets
“new source performance standards” for emissions of air pollutants
from new or modified stationary sources that fit within categories of
sources designated by the EPA. These standards are based on the “best
system of emission reduction” and must consider cost.79 Under Section
111(d), the EPA may also set best system of emissions reduction
standards for existing categories of stationary sources if they could be
regulated as new sources under the new source performance
standards.80
In addition, under Section 112, the EPA promulgates “national
emission standards for hazardous air pollutants,” including mercury
and other air toxics.81 Major sources of hazardous air pollutants must
install the “maximum achievable control technology” to reduce their
emissions.82 This technology-based standard is supplemented by a
health-based backstop, which requires the EPA to issue more stringent
standards to reduce residual health risks if the maximum achievable
control technology has not reduced the pollutant to a level that is
protective of public health.83
Other relevant portions of the Clean Air Act include: Title V,
Section 115 and Title VI. Title V contains no substantive emissions
limits, but requires that all other emissions requirements for major
facilities be compiled into one permitting document.84 Section 115 of
the Clean Air Act allows the EPA to require states to adjust their state
implementation plans to address international harms caused by
domestic emissions.85 Title VI contains various mechanisms for
addressing stratospheric ozone depletion.86

79. Id. §§ 7411(a)–(c).
80. Id. § 7411(d). There is also a question of whether Section 111(d) requires that the source
not be regulated under Section 112. For a discussion of the litigation involving this issue, see infra
Part III.B.2.
81. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 112, 84 Stat. 1685 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7412).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g)(2).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 7412.
84. Id. §§ 7602(j), 7661–7661f.
85. Id. § 7415.
86. Id. §§ 7671–7671q.
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On the whole, the Clean Air Act provides various mechanisms for
regulating a given source of air pollution. These mechanisms may be
available at the EPA’s discretion or automatically applicable
depending on the nature of the pollutant itself, what type of source is
emitting the pollution, the volume of pollution the source has the
potential to emit, whether the source is stationary or mobile, and where
the source is located. Emission reductions are achieved either by the
EPA setting maximum ambient pollutant levels, which are attained
through state implementation plans (with federal backstops), or by the
EPA requiring specific sources or source categories to meet
technological or performance standards for emissions of specific
pollutants. As it turns out, the interlocking yet distinct mechanisms by
which the Clean Air Act addresses air pollution play a critical role in
the displacement (or lack thereof) of greenhouse gas nuisance claims.
C. The Displacement of Federal Greenhouse Gas Nuisance Claims
and Its Potential Undoing
There are three Supreme Court cases relevant to the displacement
of federal common law nuisance claims involving greenhouse gases:
Massachusetts v. EPA,87 AEP, and UARG. The first, Massachusetts v.
EPA, held that the Clean Air Act’s broad statutory definition of “air
pollutant” plainly encompassed greenhouse gases. The second, AEP,
found that, because the Clean Air Act addressed greenhouse gases, it
also displaced federal common law claims involving those pollutants.
The third, UARG, held, contrary to an implicit assumption in AEP,
that the Clean Air Act’s coverage of greenhouse gases is not in fact
comprehensive, but is section- and context-specific.
1. Massachusetts v. EPA: The Clean Air Act Plainly Encompasses
Greenhouse Gases. The harbinger of AEP was Massachusetts v. EPA,
which answered a long-asked question: whether the Clean Air Act
addresses greenhouse gas emissions.88 The case traces back to 1999,
when a group of nineteen private advocacy groups petitioned the EPA
to regulate greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles under Section
87. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
88. Id. at 505. Massachusetts is more widely known for its contribution to constitutional
standing doctrine—that states in their capacity as “quasi-sovereign[s]” enjoy “special solicitude”
in the standing analysis. Id. at 520. Though standing (and states’ comparative advantage in
overcoming the hurdle of demonstrating the particularized injury element thereof) would be an
important factor in any federal nuisance suit, it is not the focus of this Note and is therefore not
discussed further.
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202 of the Clean Air Act.89 After the EPA declined, Massachusetts and
several other non-state plaintiffs asked the D.C. Circuit to review the
EPA’s decision.90 The D.C. Circuit found that the EPA had permissibly
exercised its discretion not to regulate greenhouse gases,91 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2006.92
The Supreme Court, with Justice Stevens writing for the majority,
found that the Clean Air Act’s “capacious” definition of air pollution
plainly encompassed greenhouse gases.93 Accordingly, the Court held
that the “EPA has the statutory authority to regulate the emission of
such gases from new motor vehicles”94 and that its decision whether to
regulate under Section 202 could only rest on the factors prescribed in
that section—whether greenhouse gases “cause, or contribute to, air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare.”95 Because the EPA had relied on other factors in
choosing not to regulate greenhouse gases, the Court found that the
decision was arbitrary and capricious.96
Four years after Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court in AEP relied
on Massachusetts when it found that a federal nuisance suit concerning
several power plants’ greenhouse gas emissions was displaced by the
Clean Air Act.97
2. AEP: The Ostensible Death Knell for Federal Nuisance Claims
for Greenhouse Gases. In AEP, the plaintiffs sought a court injunction
that would require four private companies and the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) to “cap [their] carbon dioxide emissions and then
reduce them by a specified percentage each year for at least a
decade.”98 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ contributions to
global warming violated the federal common law of nuisance, or

89. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
90. Id. at 53.
91. Id. at 58.
92. Massachusetts v. EPA, 548 U.S. 903 (2006) (mem.).
93. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 500.
94. Id. at 532.
95. Id. at 506 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012)).
96. Id. at 534. Instead, the EPA argued, inter alia, that existing executive branch programs
already effectively addressed climate change and that regulating greenhouse gas emissions might
impair the President’s ability to negotiate internationally. Id. at 536.
97. For a discussion of AEP’s reliance on Massachusetts, see infra Part III.A.
98. AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 419 (2011) (citation omitted).
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alternatively, the nuisance laws of the source states.99 The district court
dismissed the case, finding that it presented a political question,100 but
the Second Circuit reversed, finding that the issue was justiciable.101
Turning to the merits, the Second Circuit held that the defendants’
actions constituted a public nuisance under federal common law, which
was not displaced because the EPA had not yet regulated in the area.102
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and
held that the plaintiffs’ federal nuisance claim was displaced by the
Clean Air Act.103 Surveying the case law, Justice Ginsburg articulated
a deceptively simple summary of the displacement doctrine: “The test
for whether congressional legislation [displaces] federal common law
is simply whether the statute ‘speak[s] directly to [the] question’ at
issue.”104 Because “Massachusetts made plain that emissions of carbon
dioxide qualify as air pollution subject to regulation under the [Clean
Air] Act,” the Court found that it was “equally plain that the [Clean
Air] Act ‘speaks directly’ to emissions of carbon dioxide from the
defendants’ plants.”105 Accordingly, the Court found that, because the
Clean Air Act speaks directly to the issue of greenhouse gas emissions,
the federal common law was displaced.106
Justice Ginsburg went on to note that Section 111 of the Clean Air
Act enables the EPA to set performance standards for new and existing
stationary sources of greenhouse gases, including power plants. She
emphasized that the Clean Air Act “provides multiple avenues for
enforcement” of these standards, including civil and criminal penalties
enforceable by the EPA, states, and private citizens.107 And if the EPA
fails to promulgate these standards, states and private parties may

99. Id. at 418. In general, if the federal common law is available, then state common law
claims are not. See Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 488 (1987) (noting that if a case
“should be resolved by reference to federal common law” then “state common law [is] preempted”).
100. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated,
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
101. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 332, rev’d, AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
102. Id. at 379 (alteration in original) (“We cannot say, therefore, that EPA’s issuance of
proposed findings suffices to regulate greenhouse gases in a way that ‘speaks directly’ to Plaintiffs’
problems and thereby displaces Plaintiffs’ existing remedies under the federal common law.”).
103. AEP, 564 U.S. at 429.
104. Id. at 424 (second and third alteration in original) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)).
105. Id. (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–29 (2007)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 425.
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petition the EPA to regulate, after which those parties have a right to
review in federal court.108 Therefore, the Court concluded that “[t]he
Act itself thus provides a means to seek limits on emissions of carbon
dioxide from domestic powerplants—the same relief the plaintiffs seek
by invoking federal common law. We see no room for a parallel
track.”109
In addition, Justice Ginsburg rejected the Second Circuit’s
analysis that the federal common law is only displaced when the EPA
regulates the matter in fact. Citing Milwaukee II, the Court noted that
“the relevant question for purposes of displacement is ‘whether the
field has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a
particular manner.’”110 “The critical point,” according to Justice
Ginsburg, “is that Congress delegated to [the] EPA the decision
whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from
powerplants; the delegation is what displaces federal common law.”111
The Court remanded the state common law claims because the parties
had not briefed the issue of whether the Clean Air Act preempts state
common law.112
3. UARG: The Clean Air Act’s Greenhouse Gas Coverage Is Not
Comprehensive. In UARG, several states and industry groups
challenged two interrelated EPA rules—the “Triggering Rule”113 and
the “Tailoring Rule”114—that sought to force certain new and modified
sources of greenhouse gases to install BACT and obtain Title V
permits.115 Before issuing the rule, the EPA had issued a finding that it
believed that greenhouse gases endangered public health116 and then
proceeded to regulate mobile sources’ greenhouse gas emissions under
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 426.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 429. Because a federal law must evince a clear statement of intent to displace a
state law, AEP’s finding that the federal common law was displaced by the Clean Air Act did not
necessarily mean that state common law was also preempted. Id.
113. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by
Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010).
114. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75
Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010).
115. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2437 (2014).
116. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,497 (Dec. 15, 2009). The six pollutants were
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur
hexafluoride. Id.
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Section 202.117 The EPA believed that once it regulated greenhouse
gases as “air pollutants” under Section 202, it was also required to
regulate them under the PSD and Title V programs, which both
contain mandatory regulatory requirements for specified sources that
have the potential to emit “major” quantities of “any air pollutant.”118
But because greenhouse gases are often emitted in much greater
quantities than other pollutants, the EPA issued a “Tailoring Rule,”
that restricted the PSD and Title V requirements only to sources
already subject to PSD requirements because of their emission of
criteria pollutants—so called “anyway sources”—and to sources with
the potential to emit more than one hundred thousand tons of carbon
dioxide per year.119
In the initial litigation in the D.C. Circuit,120 a unanimous panel
held that the EPA’s interpretation that new and modified “major”
sources of greenhouse gases would be subject to the PSD requirements
was “compelled by the statute.” 121 Thus, the court found it was “crystal
clear that PSD permittees must install BACT for greenhouse gases.”122
The petitioners appealed, and in 2013, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari on the issue of whether the EPA had permissibly determined
that its regulation of greenhouse gases from mobile sources triggered
the PSD or Title V requirements.123
The Supreme Court in UARG held that the phrase “any air
pollutant” used in the PSD and Title V sections could not be construed
117. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,326–27 (May 7, 2010).
118. The PSD program requires, among other things, that a new or modified “major emitting
facility” in an attainment area obtain a PSD permit. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(C) (2018).
A “major emitting facility” has the potential to emit 250 tons per year of “any air pollutant,” or,
for certain sources, one hundred tons per year. Id. § 7479(1). Among other requirements of the
PSD program, the source must install emission controls that reflect “best available control
technology” for “each pollutant subject to regulation under” the Clean Air Act. Id. § 7475(a)(4).
In addition, Title V requires “major source[s]” to obtain a permit that reflects all of the other
emission standards required under the rest of the Clean Air Act. Id. § 7661a(a). For the purpose
of Title V, a “major source” has the potential to emit one hundred tons per year of “any air
pollutant.” Id. §§ 7661(2)(B), 7602(j); see also UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2435–36 (discussing the PSD
and Title V requirements).
119. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75
Fed. Reg. at 31,516.
120. Certain challenges to regulations issued under the Clean Air Act must be brought
directly in the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).
121. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 133–34 (2012) (per curiam),
rev’d sub nom. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
122. Id. at 137.
123. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2438 (2014).
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to include greenhouse gases.124 However, the Court nevertheless found
that the EPA could continue to treat greenhouse gases as “pollutant[s]
subject to regulation” for the purpose of requiring BACT for “anyway”
sources, which are already subject to PSD regulations because of their
criteria pollutant emissions.125
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia found that the EPA’s
interpretation of the triggering language in the PSD and Title V
programs was unreasonable because it would subject thousands of
relatively small sources of carbon dioxide to heavy regulatory burdens
without a clear statement of congressional intent to do so.126 Justice
Scalia distinguished Massachusetts, noting that the Act-wide definition
of air pollutant “is not a command to regulate, but a description of the
universe of substances the EPA may consider regulating under the
Clean Air Act’s operative provisions.”127 The Court emphasized that
the regulation must be reasonable in the context of the section at
issue.128 Because the PSD and Title V programs carry “heavy
substantive and procedural burdens,”129 Justice Scalia found that it was
unreasonable to regulate sources under those programs merely for
their capacity to emit greenhouse gases. Justice Scalia noted that the
vast economic reach of the EPA’s interpretation reduced the deference
due by the Court to the EPA, and stressed that “[w]e expect Congress
to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast
‘economic and political significance.’”130 The Court found that the
EPA’s interpretation could not be saved by its Tailoring Rule, because
the rule was effectively an administrative rewrite of the unambiguous
language of the Clean Air Act.131
Nevertheless, the Court held that the BACT requirements could
still apply to “anyway sources.” Justice Scalia noted that the BACT
language, which applies only to “each pollutant subject to regulation,”
124. Id. at 2448–49. Perhaps acknowledging that this was not the obvious textual reading of
the Clean Air Act, the Court conceded that “[t]o be sure, Congress’s profligate use of ‘air
pollutant’ where what is meant is obviously narrower than the Act-wide definition is not
conducive to clarity.” Id. at 2441.
125. Id. at 2449.
126. Id. at 2443–44.
127. Id. at 2441 (emphasis omitted).
128. Id. (stressing that “words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to
their place in the overall statutory scheme” (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000))).
129. Id. at 2443.
130. Id. at 2444 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160).
131. Id. at 2446.
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was far less open-ended and less subject to “dramatic expansion of
agency authority” than the triggering language in the PSD and Title V
sections.132 Moreover, sources that were already subject to the PSD and
Title V requirements because of their criteria pollutant emissions
would be larger and more capable of shouldering the burdens of
complying with BACT and Title V regulatory requirements for their
greenhouse gas emissions.133
Thus, UARG demonstrated that the Clean Air Act does not
comprehensively address greenhouse gases throughout its sections.
Instead, it set out a context-specific test whereby any given section may
only be said to encompass greenhouse gases if it can be reasonably
construed to do so, given the economic impact of a regulation under
that section and the clarity of the statutory language.
II. ANALYZING THE DISPLACEMENT TEST EMPLOYED IN AEP
This Part argues that AEP’s displacement analysis demonstrates
that merely legislating in the area of greenhouse gases or being silent
on the issue is insufficient to imply a legislative purpose to displace the
federal common law. Rather, as two post-AEP cases show, a statute
must provide for source-specific emission standards, enforcement
options, and remedies before it can be said to provide a “sufficient”
regulatory framework to displace the federal common law.
A. AEP: A Hybrid of Conflict and Field Displacement
Commentators have disagreed about whether AEP used a field or
conflict displacement analysis in determining whether the Clean Air
Act displaced federal nuisance claims.134 Language in the opinion
supports both theories. For instance, Justice Ginsburg rearticulated the
classic field displacement language from Milwaukee II, stating that “the
relevant question for purposes of displacement is ‘whether the field has
been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular
132. Id. at 2448.
133. Id. at 2448–49.
134. Compare Sidney F. Ansbacher, Lawyers Weigh in on AEP v. Conn., LAW360 (June 20,
2011, 8:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/252467/lawyers-weigh-in-on-aep-v-conn [https://
perma.cc/RUK4-3LGF] (arguing that AEP recognized a field displacement theory, which
“follows logically from the court’s decision in Massachusetts v. USEPA that held greenhouse gases
are pollutants that the Clean Air Act regulates”), with Molly M. Watters, Note, Fish and
Federalism: How the Asian Carp Litigation Highlights a Deficiency in the Federal Common Law
Displacement Analysis, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 535, 557 (2013) (noting that “[t]he Court
[in AEP] applied the conflict displacement rationale”).
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manner.’”135 The Court seemed to conclude that the field was indeed
occupied, noting that “Massachusetts made plain that emissions of
carbon dioxide qualify as air pollution subject to regulation under the
[Clean Air] Act.”136
On the other hand, Justice Ginsburg’s analysis also contained
elements of conflict displacement. Section 111, the opinion posited,
provides a means for the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
from power plants.137 It contains enforcement mechanisms and enables
citizens and states to petition the EPA to regulate specific sources or
pollutants.138 Moreover, states and citizens may seek redress in the
courts for the EPA’s failure to regulate.139 Accordingly, Justice
Ginsburg concluded that:
[t]he Act itself thus provides a means to seek limits on emissions of
carbon dioxide from domestic powerplants—the same relief the
plaintiffs seek by invoking federal common law. We see no room for
a parallel track.140

This suggests that the field displacement theory contending that
silence in a comprehensive statute may evince a legislative intent not
to regulate is incompatible with AEP’s reasoning.141 Otherwise, the
Court could have simply stopped once it concluded that the Clean Air
Act regulates greenhouse gases. Instead, it carefully parsed the text of
the statute and emphasized that the Clean Air Act must provide a
“means to seek limits on emissions of [greenhouse gases] from [a
specific source]” for federal nuisance claims to be displaced as to that
source.142
Accordingly, it seems that merely legislating in the field of
greenhouse gas nuisance law is insufficient to displace the federal
common law. Rather, the Court must be satisfied that Congress
delegated the authority to regulate the particular matter by “speak[ing]
directly to [the] question” in the statutory text.143 Though Congress is

135. AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 426 (2011) (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 324 (1981)).
136. Id. at 424 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–29 (2007)).
137. Id. at 424–25.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 425.
140. Id.
141. Cf. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (stressing that statutory silence is
insufficient to displace long-standing federal common law).
142. AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 425 (2011).
143. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981).
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free to choose the “particular manner” by which to address an issue, it
nevertheless must “provide[] a sufficient legislative solution to the
particular [issue] to warrant a conclusion” that the legislation speaks
directly to it.144 The question then becomes: “[H]ow much
congressional action is enough?”145
B. What Constitutes A “Sufficient Legislative Solution”
Two post-AEP cases, Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(Asian Carp Case),146 and Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil
Corp.,147 have sought to answer this question. In the Asian Carp Case,
five states bordering the Great Lakes brought a federal common law
public nuisance suit against the Army Corps of Engineers to enjoin it
from permitting the introduction of invasive carp into the Great
Lakes.148 Considering the displacement doctrine espoused by AEP and
its predecessors, the Seventh Circuit found that “[t]he important
displacement question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient
legislative solution to the particular interstate nuisance here to warrant
a conclusion that this legislation has occupied the field to the exclusion
of federal common law.”149 Applying this test, the court held that that
the states’ nuisance claim was not displaced even though “Congress has
not been mute on the subject of the carp.”150 The court emphasized that
Congress’s “narrow delegation” of power to the Corps to investigate
and study invasive carp did not contain “any enforcement mechanism
or recourse for any entity or party negatively affected by the carp.”151
Thus, the court concluded that the legislation had not displaced the
states’ claim, because it was more similar to the original Federal Water
Pollution Control Act at issue in Milwaukee I than the Clean Air Act

144. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2012) (second
alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Asian Carp Case, 667 F.3d 765, 777 (7th Cir.
2011)).
145. Id.
146. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Asian Carp Case), 667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011).
147. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
148. Asian Carp Case, 667 F.3d at 768.
149. Id. at 777.
150. Id. Congress had permitted the Corps to construct an electric barrier preventing the carp
from passing through the Chicago River Ship and Sanitary Canal into the Great Lakes, and had
provided for numerous studies on how to control aquatic nuisance species. Id. at 779–80.
151. Id. at 780.
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or the amended Clean Water Act at issue in AEP and Milwaukee II,
respectively.152
In Kivalina, the Alaskan city of Kivalina and a village of Inupiat
Native Alaskans brought a federal nuisance claim against multiple
energy companies.153 The tribe and village were seeking damages for
“[m]assive erosion” threatening the “imminent devastation” of their
community, which they alleged was caused by global warming
attributable to the defendants’ energy production.154 The Ninth Circuit
applied the analysis in the Asian Carp Case to the Clean Air Act,
asking whether the statute presented a “sufficient legislative solution”
to displace the plaintiffs’ federal nuisance claim for damages.155 The
Ninth Circuit emphasized that “the lack of a federal remedy may be a
factor to be considered in determining whether Congress has displaced
federal common law,” but it clarified that, unlike the traditional
conflict displacement theory, the type of remedy provided by Congress
was not to be considered when evaluating whether the Clean Air Act
displaces federal nuisance claims.156 Thus, the court found that AEP
applied, and that the Clean Air Act displaced the plaintiffs’ federal
nuisance claim, even though they were seeking damages, not injunctive
relief.157
This gloss on the displacement analysis suggests that the Clean Air
Act must contain three major components to constitute “a sufficient
legislative solution”158 displacing the federal common law: (1) authority
to set regulatory standards; (2) a mechanism to enforce those
standards; and (3) some sort of remedy or recourse for affected parties.
Because Justice Ginsburg in AEP was satisfied that the Clean Air Act
contains all three elements as applied to greenhouse gases, she
concluded that the federal nuisance claim was displaced. But, as
discussed below, this basic assumption was undermined by UARG.

152. Id. Decided in 2011 before UARG, this case also apparently assumed that the Clean Air
Act comprehensively regulated greenhouse gases. See id. at 778 (noting that, in AEP, “[t]he Court
found it important that the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to identify and establish performance
standards for all carbon-dioxide emitters” (emphasis added)).
153. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853–54 (9th Cir. 2012).
154. Id. at 853.
155. Id. at 856.
156. Id. at 857 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 858.
158. Asian Carp Case, 667 F.3d 765, 777 (7th Cir. 2011).
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III. REEVALUATING THE CLEAN AIR ACT’S DISPLACEMENT OF
FEDERAL COMMON LAW GREENHOUSE GAS NUISANCE CLAIMS
AFTER UARG
This Part contends that UARG undermined a core premise of
AEP—that the Clean Air Act comprehensively addresses greenhouse
gases—and instead set out a contextual test for determining whether a
given section of the Clean Air Act can be construed to address those
pollutants. Applying this test to the five sections of the Clean Air Act
that might be used to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
stationary sources, this Part finds that only two sections, Sections
111(d) and 115, might credibly encompass greenhouse gas emissions,
but both sections’ coverage is far from certain. This Part concludes that,
if these sources are not regulated under either of these sections, then
the Clean Air Act cannot be said to present a “sufficient legislative
solution” as required by AEP, and federal nuisance claims would again
be available as to those sources.
A. UARG Undermined AEP and Created a New Context-Specific
Test
In UARG, Justice Scalia found that the D.C. Circuit’s opinion
upholding the EPA’s interpretation of the PSD and Title V triggering
language was based on a flawed syllogism: “Under Massachusetts, the
general, Act-wide definition of ‘air pollutant’ includes greenhouse
gases; the Clean Air Act requires permits for major emitters of ‘any air
pollutant’; therefore, the Clean Air Act requires permits for major
emitters of greenhouse gases.”159 But Justice Scalia noted that “[t]he
conclusion follows from the premises only if the air pollutants referred
to in the permit-requiring provisions (the minor premise) are the same
air pollutants encompassed by the Act-wide definition as interpreted
in Massachusetts (the major premise).”160 This proposition, according
to the Court, was “obviously untenable.”161
The Court in AEP seems to have rested its decision on the same
flawed syllogism. AEP employed none of UARG’s contextual analysis;
it did not ask whether interpreting Section 111 to regulate greenhouse
gases would be reasonable, or whether a “clear statement” should be
required given the potentially vast economic and political significance

159. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2439 (2014).
160. Id.
161. Id.
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of regulating greenhouse gases under the section. Instead it
unhesitatingly assumed that Section 111 provided for the regulation of
greenhouse gases, noting that because “Massachusetts made plain that
emissions of carbon dioxide qualify as air pollution subject to
regulation under the [Clean Air] Act,” it was “equally plain that the
[Clean Air] Act ‘speaks directly’ to emissions of carbon dioxide from
the defendants’ plants.”162
AEP’s uncritical conclusion that Section 111 provided for the
regulation of greenhouse gases appears to have been based on an
assumption drawn from Massachusetts v. EPA that the Clean Air Act
comprehensively addressed greenhouse gases.163 Indeed, the D.C.
Circuit, the EPA and many others apparently believed this exact
premise—that the Clean Air Act’s act-wide definition of “air
pollutant” meant that greenhouse gases were addressed throughout
the statute.164 But because UARG demonstrates that the Clean Air Act
does not comprehensively address greenhouse gases, it can no longer
be assumed that federal nuisance suits against stationary sources’
greenhouse gas emissions are displaced in every context. Instead, the
claims would only be displaced if a specific section or sections of the
Clean Air Act provide for “sufficient” regulation of those sources.165
162. AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011) (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–29
(2007)).
163. Even Justice Alito, who concurred in the judgment of AEP, seemed to assume that
Massachusetts held that the Clean Air Act comprehensively addressed greenhouse gases. Id. at
430 (Alito, J. concurring) (“I concur in the judgment, and I agree with the Court’s displacement
analysis on the assumption (which I make for the sake of argument because no party contends
otherwise) that the interpretation of the Clean Air Act, adopted by the majority in Massachusetts
v. EPA, is correct.” (citations omitted)).
164. See, e.g., Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg.
44,354, 44,354 (July 30, 2008) (discussing “the various [Clean Air Act] provisions that may be
applicable to regulate [greenhouse gases]” and noting that Massachusetts “ruled that the Clean
Air Act . . . authorize[d] regulation of greenhouse gases”); Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc.
v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam), rev’d sub nom., UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427
(2014) (noting that Massachusetts “clarified that greenhouse gases are an ‘air pollutant’ subject to
regulation under the Clean Air Act”); cf. RICHARD REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY
687 (3d ed. 2015) (noting that the basic approach of the Clean Air Act, like other command-andcontrol statutes, is to “list a number of pollutants and regulate them comprehensively” (emphasis
added)).
165. It should be noted that it does not appear that any other statutes provide a sufficient
legislative solution to be said to displace federal public nuisance suits in the context of greenhouse
gases. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 379 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 564 U.S.
410 (2011) (surveying all federal legislation concerning greenhouse gases and concluding that
none of it displaced federal nuisance claims); see also Mensher, supra note 37, at 484 (reaching
the same conclusion). Environmental groups have petitioned the EPA to use other federal
environmental statutes like the Toxic Substances Control Act and the Endangered Species Act
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Determining whether a given section of the Clean Air Act
provides for the regulation of a source’s greenhouse gas emissions
requires the same contextual analysis employed in UARG. There are
two questions central to the UARG test: first, whether it is reasonable
in the context of a given section to assume that the provision’s use of
the term “air pollutant” encompasses greenhouse gases; and second,
for cases in which the regulation would grant the EPA authority of
“vast ‘economic and political significance,’” whether the text “speak[s]
clearly” to the matter.166
B. Applying the UARG Test to the Clean Air Act: Are There Gaps in
Greenhouse Coverage?
Applying this test, UARG itself found that greenhouse gas
emissions of “anyway sources”—new or modified stationary sources
located in attainment areas—can be regulated under the PSD and Title
V programs. Because these programs apparently provide for the
regulation of covered sources’ greenhouse gas emissions, federal
nuisance claims against these sources are probably displaced. But there
are still many other stationary sources—especially existing sources that
have not been modified, which are not covered under these sections.
Whether federal nuisance claims against these sources are displaced
requires a careful analysis applying the UARG test to each potentially
relevant section of the Clean Air Act.
Five sections of the Clean Air Act might be used to address
existing sources’ greenhouse gas emissions. They are Sections 108 and
109 (the NAAQS program); Section 111(d) (performance standards
for certain categories of existing sources); Section 112 (hazardous air
pollutants); Section 115 (international air pollution); and Section 615
(stratospheric ozone). Only if none of these sections apply would a
federal nuisance suit be viable.

to create substantive limitations on greenhouse emissions, but they have not been successful. See,
e.g., Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Ocean Acidification; TSCA Section 21 Petition; Reasons for
Agency Response, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,577 (Oct. 7, 2015) (denying a petition to regulate greenhouse
gases under TSCA).
166. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)); see also Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1933, 1943 ( 2017) (discussing the “power canons,” including the “clear statement”
doctrine espoused in UARG); cf. Michigan v. EPA., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (citing UARG in
declining to give deference to the EPA’s interpretation that the Clean Air Act Section 112(j) does
not require the consideration of cost).
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1. Sections 108 and 109—NAAQS. Sections 108 and 109 provide
mechanisms for the EPA to develop ambient standards for criteria
pollutants, which states then apply to new and existing mobile and
stationary sources. Section 108 directs the EPA Administrator to list
criteria air pollutants which “in his judgment, cause or contribute to air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare” and “the presence of which in the ambient air results
from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources.”167 For each
criteria pollutant, Section 109 in turn directs the EPA to promulgate a
national ambient air quality standard at a level “requisite to protect the
public health” with an “adequate margin of safety.”168
It is unlikely that Sections 108 and 109 could be interpreted to
address greenhouse gases, as doing so would yield the same untenably
high administrative costs and regulatory burdens that the Court
recoiled from in UARG. For one, designating greenhouse gases as
criteria pollutants would cause PSD and Title V requirements to apply
to the same small sources that UARG already found could not be
regulated under those programs.169 Moreover, the EPA is not
permitted to consider costs when determining the ambient levels of
greenhouse gases that are protective of public health with an adequate
margin of safety,170 which could result in crushing costs on states and
industry to come into compliance with whatever standard is chosen by
the EPA. And because greenhouse gases are globally mixing
pollutants, it would be difficult if not impossible for a state to
individually attain any ambient standard set by EPA. Thus, it appears
that, under the contextual reasonableness test of UARG, Sections 108
and 109 probably do not provide for the regulation of greenhouse
gases.
2. Section 111(d)—Existing Source Performance Standards.
Section 111 enables the EPA to set new source performance standards
for designated categories of new and modified stationary sources171 and
symmetrical standards for existing sources.172 The AEP Court explicitly
assumed that greenhouse gases could be regulated under Section
167. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (2018).
168. Id. § 7409(b)(1).
169. For a discussion of Justice Scalia’s criticism of this issue in UARG, see Part I.C.3.
170. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (“The text of § 109(b) . . .
unambiguously bars cost considerations from the NAAQS-setting process . . . .”).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b).
172. Id. § 7411(d).
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111,173 and the UARG Court conceded that the section might not be “ill
suited to accommodating greenhouse gases.”174 Despite these powerful
pronouncements, opponents have challenged the EPA’s authority to
regulate power plants’ emissions of greenhouse gases under Section
111.175
In 2015, the EPA issued its final rule on greenhouse gas emissions
from existing power plants: the Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines
for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units,
known colloquially as the Clean Power Plan.176 The Clean Power Plan
established state-specific requirements for carbon dioxide reductions
from the power sector, based on a combination of increased efficiency,
trading, and transitions to natural gases and renewables.177 On the same
day the Plan was published, twenty-seven states and a broad coalition
of industry opponents sued the EPA in the D.C. Circuit, levelling a
bevy of statutory and constitutional challenges against the EPA’s
interpretation of Section 111(d).178 The Supreme Court stayed the
Clean Power Plan pending a decision by the D.C. Circuit.179 However,
on October, 16 2017, the Trump administration issued a proposal to
repeal the regulation,180 and the D.C. Circuit has granted the

173. AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 425 (2011) (examining Section 111 and concluding that “[t]he Act
itself thus provides a means to seek limits on emissions of carbon dioxide from domestic
powerplants”).
174. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 n.5 (2014).
175. The main case challenging the EPA’s 111(b) authority to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from new and modified power plants is North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15-1381 (D.C. Cir.
filed Oct. 23, 2015). However, the primary arguments in North Dakota are not whether Section
111(b) permits the regulation of new sources’ greenhouse gas emissions, but rather how the EPA
went about developing the regulations. See State Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 13–24, North
Dakota v. EPA, No. 15-1381 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2015) (arguing that the EPA did not apply
the correct legal standard to its determination that a proposed system of emission reduction was
adequately supported). Since it is not substantially contested that Section 111(b) provides for the
regulation of greenhouse gases from new or modified major sources, federal common law
nuisance claims against these sources—which may also be subject to BACT due to their criteria
pollutant emissions—are probably displaced. Thus, the main question is whether existing sources
of greenhouse gases can be regulated under Section 111(d).
176. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
177. Id.
178. West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. argued Sept. 27, 2016); Clean Power Plan
Case Resources, supra note 19.
179. West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (mem.).
180. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48035 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
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administration’s request to hold the case in abeyance during the repeal
process.181
Ultimately, it seems unlikely that the D.C. Circuit will issue a
decision on the merits in this case, leaving resolution of the scope of
the EPA’s ability to regulate greenhouse gases under Section 111(d)
for another day.182 However, the arguments raised by the petitioners in
West Virginia remain relevant to this Note because their resolution is
necessary to determine whether, and to what extent, Section 111(d)
provides for the regulation of greenhouse gases. The major arguments
can be broken into three categories: first, that the EPA impermissibly
regulated beyond the “fence line” of the source facilities;183 second,
that sources which are regulated under Section 112 cannot be regulated
under Section 111(d); and third, that the Clean Power Plan
unconstitutionally commandeers the states’ authority to regulate their
power sectors.184
The petitioners’ first argument—that the EPA cannot regulate
beyond the fence line—addresses the question of whether, in crafting
the Clean Power Plan, the EPA improperly considered emissions
reductions that could not be accomplished by the equipment within the
boundaries of the source facilities themselves. In the Clean Power Plan,
the EPA construed Section 111’s “best system of emission reduction”
requirement to include market-scale, generation-shifting measures and
increased use of renewables.185 The petitioners have argued that this
was an impermissible construction of the statute and that Section
111(d) permits the EPA to set emissions standards based only on
measures that can be applied to individual sources, such as adopting
181. The D.C. Circuit first granted the Trump administration’s request to hold the case in
abeyance while it reconsidered the regulation in April 2017. See Order Granting Motion to Hold
Case in Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (Apr. 28, 2017), ECF No. 1668274. After
EPA published its notice of repeal in the Federal Register, the D.C. Circuit issued an order on its
own motion extending the period of the abeyance for another sixty days. Order Continuing
Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (Nov. 9, 2017), ECF No. 1703889.
182. See Ellen M. Gilmer, Sidelined Climate Rule Suffers Another Blow in the Courtroom,
E&E NEWS (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060058556/search?
keyword=clean+power+plan [https://perma.cc/5FT5-LGST] (discussing the Clean Power Plan’s
“deep freeze”).
183. In other words, it considered emissions reductions that could not be accomplished by the
equipment within the boundaries of the facilities themselves.
184. See LINDA TSANG & ALEXANDRA M. WYATT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLEAN
POWER PLAN: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND PENDING LITIGATION IN WEST VIRGINIA V. EPA 16–
30 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44480.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC6F-53GK] (overviewing
the main litigation challenging the Clean Power Plan).
185. Id. at 7.
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pollution control devices.186 Because the EPA considered factors
outside of the “fence line” of the power plants when setting the
performance standard, they contend that it overstepped its authority
under Section 111(d).187
The petitioners’ argument would still permit source-specific
greenhouse gas emissions regulation under Section 111, but certain
heavily polluting sources might be exempted due to the costs of
compliance. Because Section 111 requires the EPA to consider cost
when developing its performance standards, 188 there would likely be
some sources that are so outdated and dirty that any “fence line”
upgrades would be economically unfeasible.189 In the oral arguments
for West Virginia, Judge Cornelia Pillard pressed this point, asking
whether, under the fence line argument, certain sources could be
“necessarily immunized from regulation under Section 111(d).”190 The
petitioners’ counsel responded that “it’s [a] question of what tools
Congress has given.”191 He continued: “[I]n the UARG case the
Supreme Court found that notwithstanding the importance of climate
change, notwithstanding the purpose of the Clean Air Act, some of
those regulations were unlawful because they exceeded [the] EPA’s
authority, and that’s all we’re saying here.”192 This suggests that, if the
EPA cannot regulate beyond the fence line, there may be a small
subset of heavily polluting existing sources that cannot be regulated
under Section 111(d) because requiring efficiency upgrades would be
too costly.
The petitioners’ second argument—that sources regulated under
Section 112 cannot be regulated under Section 111(d)—stems from the
fact that conflicting versions of an amendment to Section 111(d) were
both passed and codified into law in the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments.193 Under the Senate version, Section 111(d) cannot be

186. Id. at 19–20.
187. Id.
188. Section 111 requires that costs be “tak[en] into account” when developing best system of
emissions reduction regulations under this section. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(i).
189. Cf. Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (finding
that Section 111 does not require a full cost-benefit analysis but that regulations under that section
must still be economically and technologically feasible).
190. Transcript of Oral Argument at 94–95, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 27, 2016).
191. Id. at 95.
192. Id. at 95–96.
193. TSANG & WYATT, supra note 184, at 21.
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used to regulate any “air pollutants” regulated under Section 112.194
The House version, on the other hand, prohibits Section 111(d) from
regulating air pollutants “emitted from a source category which is
regulated under” Section 112.195 The petitioners have argued that the
House amendments should control. Because power plants are
regulated under Section 112 for their emissions of mercury, this version
of Section 111(d) would not allow the EPA to regulate those plants’
carbon dioxide emissions in any manner.196 Thus, the petitioner’s
reading of Section 111(d) would create a loophole where existing
sources like power plants could not be subject to performance
standards for their emissions of carbon dioxide or any other
pollutants.197
The petitioners’ third claim is based on the Tenth Amendment,
and contends that, in issuing the Clean Power Plan, the EPA
impermissibly arrogated to itself traditional state control of the power
grid and commandeered the states and their legislatures.198 Petitioners
have argued that the cooperative federalist structure of the Clean Air
Act, which enables the EPA to issue a federal implementation plan if
states choose not to issue their own state implementation plan, does
not cure the problem because it nevertheless “leaves States no choice
but to alter their laws and programs governing electricity generation
and delivery to accord with federal policy.”199 If this argument is
correct, it would mean that Section 111(d) could not be used to regulate
the power sector and might call into question the cooperative
federalism components of the Clean Air Act in general.
3. Section 112—Hazardous Air Pollutants. Section 112 enables the
EPA to set technological standards for new and existing stationary
sources of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). To be considered a HAP,
the pollutant must present “through inhalation or other routes of
exposure, a threat of adverse human health effects . . . or adverse
194. Act of Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 2399, 2574.
195. Id. § 108(g), 104 Stat. at 2467 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1)(A)(i) (2018)) (emphasis
added).
196. Among their arguments, the petitioners point to a footnote in AEP which states that the
“EPA may not employ [Section 111(d)] if existing stationary sources of the pollutant in question
are regulated under . . . § [1]12.” TSANG & WYATT, supra note 184, at 22 (alterations in original)
(quoting Opening Brief of Petitioner’s on Core Legal Issues at 61–74, AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (2011)
(No. 10-174)).
197. TSANG & WYATT, supra note 184, at 23.
198. Id. at 23–24.
199. Id. at 23.
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environmental effects.”200 The EPA must develop emission standards
for major stationary sources emitting more than ten tons per year of
any one HAP or twenty-five tons per year of any combination of
HAPs.201 These standards must reflect the “maximum achievable
control technology” achieved by the best performing 12 percent of
existing sources of those HAPs.202
Applying the UARG test, it seems unlikely that Section 112 could
be construed to address greenhouse gases. Section 112 has historically
been used only to regulate toxic substances that have direct effects on
human health when emitted at relatively low quantities.203 Though the
text also permits the regulation of air pollutants that affect the
environment, it still seems to require that those pollutants affect the
environment directly through some “route[] of exposure.”204 Because
greenhouse gases primarily affect the environment indirectly through
their contribution to global warming, they may not fit within the plain
text of the section.205 Even more problematically, every stationary
source that emits more than ten tons of greenhouse gases per year
would be subject to maximum achievable control technology
standards. This threshold is ten times less than triggering levels in the
PSD and Title V provisions, and would subject thousands of small
sources to burdensome regulatory requirements.206 Therefore,
greenhouse gases probably cannot be regulated under Section 112.

200. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(2) (emphasis added).
201. Id. § 7412(a)(1).
202. Id. §§ 7412(d)(3), (g)(2).
203. E.g., EPA Announces Biggest Air Toxic Reduction in Agency History, EPA (Mar. 1,
1994), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/epa-announces-biggest-air-toxic-reduction-agencyhistory.html [https://perma.cc/C5UV-9CBV].
204. Id. § 7412(b)(2).
205. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg.
44,354, 44,368 (July 30, 2008) (discussing the applicability of Section 112 to greenhouse gases and
concluding it would be “inappropriate” to regulate them under Section 112). But see Mark Bond,
Can and Should Greenhouse Gases Be Regulated as Hazardous Air Pollutants Under Clean Air
Act Sect. 112?, SABINE CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L. 4 (2016), https://web.law.columbia.edu/
sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/bond_-_ghgs_regulated_as_haps.pdf [https://perma.
cc/BFP4-MS3L] (arguing that it is possible to regulate greenhouse gases under this section).
206. See UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2443–44 (2014) (“[W]e think it beyond reasonable debate
that requiring permits for sources based solely on their emission of greenhouse gases at the 100–
and 250–tons–per–year levels set forth in the statute would be ‘incompatible’ with ‘the substance
of Congress’ regulatory scheme.’” (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 156 (2000))).
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4. Section 115—International Air Pollution. Section 115 authorizes
the EPA to regulate domestic air pollution that endangers other
countries.207 The regulations are implemented through state or federal
implementation plans, and could apply to all sources of the pollutant,
including new and existing mobile and stationary sources.208 Two
conditions must be satisfied before the EPA can regulate under the
section: first, the EPA must determine, after “receipt of reports . . .
from any duly constituted international agency” that an “air pollutant
or pollutants emitted in the United States cause or contribute to air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare in a foreign country”; and second, the foreign country
must give the United States “essentially the same rights with respect to
the prevention or control of air pollution occurring in that country as
is given that country by [Section 115].”209 If these prerequisites are met,
the EPA must require the polluting states to revise their state
implementation plans with “respect to so much of the applicable
implementation plan as is inadequate to prevent or eliminate the
endangerment.”210
Section 115 seems to pass step one of the UARG test, but it is
unclear how it would fare at step two. Because states—or the EPA
through a federal implementation plan—could flexibly determine how
to accomplish the emissions reductions, small sources incapable of
shouldering heavy regulatory burdens would not necessarily be subject
to the unavoidable regulatory requirements that the UARG Court
found “obviously untenable.”211 However, because a Section 115
regulation could potentially apply to every economic sector in every
state, its opponents would argue that construing the section to
encompass greenhouse gases requires a “clear statement” from
Congress, which—the argument would go—is not present in the text of
the section.212
5. Section 615—Stratospheric Ozone Protection. Section 615
requires the EPA to “promptly promulgate” regulations respecting the

207. 42 U.S.C. § 7415.
208. Id. § 7415(b).
209. Id. § 7415(a), (c).
210. Id. § 7415(b).
211. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2439.
212. But see Michael Burger et al., Legal Pathways To Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Under Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 370–93 (2016) (arguing that
Section 115 can and should be used to regulate greenhouse gases).
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control of “any substance, practice, process, or activity” that the EPA
believes endangers the public health or welfare by affecting the
stratosphere, especially stratospheric ozone.213
Whether greenhouse gases could be addressed under this section
depends on two central questions: first, whether the gases’ effect on the
stratosphere in fact causes danger to the public health or welfare;214 and
second, whether the statute is read as speaking clearly to the issue of
greenhouse gases. Although some greenhouse gases do deplete the
ozone, many of these have been phased out and replaced with
chemicals that have high global warming potential but no effect on the
ozone.215 Thus, not all greenhouse gases would fall under the umbrella
of Section 615.
Moreover, it is far from clear whether the section speaks clearly to
the issue of greenhouse gases at all. Title VI of the Clean Air Act is
dedicated to protecting stratospheric ozone, but a regulation
concerning greenhouse gases would be primarily devoted to preventing
climate change.216 Therefore, it is unclear whether Section 615
addresses greenhouse gases, but it seems less promising than Section
115.
C. These Potential Gaps in Greenhouse Gas Coverage Might Create
Openings for Federal Common Law Nuisance Claims
The above analysis indicates that Sections 108 and 109, 112, and
615 probably do not encompass greenhouse gases and therefore would
not themselves displace the federal common law. That leaves two
sections—Sections 111(d) and 115—as potential candidates for
regulating existing sources greenhouse gases, but there are strong
arguments against their applicability.217 If these sections are found not

213. 42 U.S.C. § 7671n.
214. See REVESZ, supra note 164, at 550 (suggesting that “[s]tratospheric ozone may be
affected by increases in concentration of GHGs”).
215. Reducing Hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) Use and Emissions in the Federal Sector Through
SNAP, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/snap/reducing-hydrofluorocarbon-hfc-use-and-emissionsfederal-sector [https://perma.cc/7EYY-LMFS].
216. Cf. Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 458–59 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that
non-ozone-depleting substances cannot be regulated under Section 612, which has much broader
language than Section 615).
217. One other candidate might be the new source review provisions for existing stationary
sources located in nonattainment areas, which are required to comply with “reasonably available
control technology” (RACT). 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501–7515. Because the nonattainment section of the
Clean Air Act parallels the PSD provisions, compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501–7515 (providing tiered
pollution control requirements for nonattainment areas), with §§ 7471–7493 (providing tiered
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to address existing sources’ greenhouse gas emissions, then these gaps
in coverage could be filled by the federal common law.
Regarding Section 111(d), each of the arguments advanced by the
petitioners in the Clean Power Plan lawsuit—the fence line argument,
the Section 112 challenge, and the anti-commandeering challenge—
would create different gaps for the federal common law to fill.218 First,
if the petitioners’ fence line argument is right, then federal nuisance
claims might be leveraged against the dirtiest sources of greenhouse
gases. The inevitable counterargument—that Section 111(d)’s
requirement of cost consideration evinces a legislative intent to exclude
sources for which compliance would be too costly—is unavailing. The
lack of a legislative remedy under Section 111(d) should not be
construed as an explicit choice by Congress to exempt these sources
from pollution controls altogether; indeed, these same sources may be
subject to regulation for their emissions of other pollutants under other
Clean Air Act sections that do not allow cost consideration. Rather, it
means only that Section 111(d) does not provide a framework to
address these sources’ greenhouse gas emissions. As AEP and its
progeny demonstrate, to implicitly displace federal nuisance claims,
the Clean Air Act must provide a “sufficient” framework to address a
given source’s greenhouse gases. If these mechanisms are not available
for extremely dirty power plants’ greenhouse gas emissions, then the
federal common law cannot be said to be displaced.
Second, if the Section 112 argument is valid, then potentially all
sources regulated under Section 112 could be subject to federal
nuisance claims. The counterargument here (in addition to an
argument like the fence line objection) would be that the EPA still has
the authority to regulate these sources’ greenhouse gas emissions—it
would just need to undo the Section 112 regulations first. But the
delegation of this choice is not itself sufficient to displace the federal
common law—the statute must contain a “sufficient legislative
pollution control mechanisms for attainment areas), UARG’s analysis would probably be the
same, and existing sources subject to RACT because of their emissions of “criteria pollutants”
would presumably also be potentially subject to RACT for their greenhouse gas emissions.
Though RACT is a more lenient standard than BACT, it would still mean that a source’s
greenhouse gas emissions can be regulated, and therefore federal nuisance claims would be
displaced. But because RACT applies to only to a relatively small subset of sources, see Counties
Designated “Nonattainment,” EPA (June 20, 2017), https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/greenbook/
mapnpoll.html [https://perma.cc/BFC3-PB72] (identifying relatively few areas of nonattainment
where RACT would apply), this Note does not address this provision further.
218. Assuming that no other section would provide for the regulation of those sources’
greenhouse gas emissions either.
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solution.”219 As the EPA observed, the agency “would have to choose
between regulating HAP or Section 111 air pollutants, leaving a ‘gap’
and allowing the ‘unregulated emission of pollutants not listed as
‘hazardous’ . . . but nonetheless dangerous to public health or
welfare.’”220 During oral arguments for the Clean Power Plan litigation,
Judge Patricia Millet observed that the petitioners’ position was a “bait
and switch,” and portentously asked whether accepting their argument
would place the law “back in the land of having to just deal with all . . .
greenhouse gases [with] common law nuisance actions.”221 Indeed, it
does.
Finally, if the petitioners’ commandeering argument is accepted,
then nuisance claims would seem to be viable against power plants and
other sources that are heavily regulated by state law. The likely
objection here would be based on federalism and judicial restraint—
that if the EPA cannot commandeer the states then neither should the
federal courts. This seems unlikely to succeed, as the courts have a long
history of compelling compliance with federal law.222 But even if a
federal court declined to issue an injunction forcing the power industry
to reduce its emissions, a substantial damages award could be very
effective in catalyzing regulatory change.223
The Section 115 analysis is simpler: it is all or nothing. If Section
115 is found to embrace greenhouse gases, then the Clean Air Act
could be used to comprehensively regulate greenhouse gas emissions
and the federal common law would be displaced. But if not, federal
219. Asian Carp Case, 667 F.3d 765, 777 (7th Cir. 2011). As the Seventh Circuit pointed out,
the statement in AEP that “the delegation [of regulatory authority from Congress to the agency]
is what displaces federal law” must be read in the context—AEP merely meant that the EPA does
not have to regulate before the common law may be said to be displaced. Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 426 (2011)). Rather,
Congress’s decision to assign a particular problem to an executive agency . . . may be
evidence of displacement, but the ebb and flow of agency action neither diminishes nor
increases the role of federal common law. The important displacement question is
whether Congress has provided a sufficient legislative solution to the particular
interstate nuisance . . . .
Id.
220. TSANG & WYATT, supra note 184, at 22 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Respondent EPA’s
Initial Brief at 83–84, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 28, 2016)).
221. Transcript of Oral Argument at 172, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Sept.
27, 2016).
222. E.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 426 (1819) (“[T]he [C]onstitution
and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme . . . they control the [C]onstitution and laws
of the respective [s]tates, and cannot be controlled by them.”).
223. For further discussion of the possible benefits of substantial damage awards, see infra
Part IV.
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common law nuisance claims would be viable against those sources not
addressed under other sections.
In sum, if any of the arguments challenging Section 111(d) are
correct, then federal nuisance claims would probably be available
against certain existing sources of greenhouse gas emissions, unless
Section 115 encompasses greenhouse gases. Section 115 is a fine
candidate, but its coverage of greenhouse gases would be hotly
contested. If neither Section 111(d) nor Section 115 fully encompass
greenhouse gases, then there would be no standards, enforcement
mechanisms, or remedies to address certain existing sources’
greenhouse gas emissions. In other words, the Clean Air Act would not
represent the “sufficient legislative solution” required under AEP’s
own analysis to address these sources’ emissions. This would mean that
federal common law nuisance claims against those sources would not
be displaced, creating an important opening for the doctrine to fill the
Clean Air Act’s gaps in greenhouse gas coverage.
IV. USING THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW TO CATALYZE
COMPREHENSIVE GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION
As discussed in Part III, the Clean Air Act’s coverage of existing
sources’ greenhouse gas emissions is far from certain. A federal
nuisance suit in the face of this uncertainty could have two outcomes.
On one hand, such a suit could compel a court to clarify that Section
111(d) and/or Section 115 do indeed encompass greenhouse gases,
thereby displacing the common law, which ultimately could force the
EPA to regulate those gases under those sections. On the other hand,
if the common law is found not to be displaced, industry actors facing
enormous liabilities may be incentivized to lobby Congress for more
comprehensive legislation that is preemptive. Ultimately, the objective
of either outcome is the same: to catalyze comprehensive regulatory
coverage of greenhouse gases in the United States.
The Clean Air Act’s coverage of most existing sources’
greenhouse gas emissions primarily hinges on two sections: Section
111(d) and Section 115. But, as discussed in Part III, whether and to
what extent these two sections provide for the regulation of
greenhouse gases from existing sources is an open question,
particularly because the D.C. Circuit signaled it would no longer issue
a decision on the merits of the Clean Power Plan—which was premised
on Section 111(d). Given this uncertainty, a court hearing a federal
nuisance suit against existing sources would need to determine whether
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either section provides for the regulation of the defendant’s
greenhouse gas emissions before it could dismiss the suit. 224 The
resolution of this issue would be salutary, win or lose.
On the one hand, a judicial finding that either Section 111(d) or
Section 115 addresses existing sources’ greenhouse gas emissions and
thereby displaces the federal common law would mean that the EPA
could regulate greenhouse gases under those sections. Either section
could be used by the EPA to create effective market-based regulations
that could substantially reduce greenhouse gases at much lower costs
than traditional command-and-control approaches used in other
sections of the Clean Air Act.225
That judicial finding could also be used to force the EPA to
develop greenhouse gas regulations under these sections. For instance,
under Section 115, if the two threshold requirements are met—
international endangerment and reciprocity—then the statute provides
that the EPA “shall” notify the states and require them to amend their
state implementation plans as necessary to “prevent or eliminate the
endangerment.”226 Since greenhouse gases emitted from the United
States undisputedly contribute to climate change, which is dangerous
to every country,227 and international agreements like the Paris
Agreement seem to satisfy the reciprocity requirement,228 then both
threshold requirements would seem to be met. This would create a
nondiscretionary duty for the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases under

224. It would not be enough merely to say that other sections might address greenhouse gases.
A statute cannot “speak directly” to the question without addressing the question to begin with.
In every case in which courts have found the common law to be displaced, they have found that
the statute affirmatively addressed the issue, not merely that it might have. If that were the case,
it would have been unnecessary for AEP to discuss Massachusetts or Section 111(d) at all.
225. See, e.g., Burger et al., supra note 212, at 360–63 (discussing the mechanisms of a Section
115 regulation and noting that the “EPA and the states could use the provision to establish an
economy-wide, cross-sectoral GHG emissions trading program that incorporates both stationary
and mobile sources”).
226. 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a)–(c) (2018).
227. Indeed, the EPA’s endangerment finding for greenhouse gases under Section 202 of the
Clean Air Act was based in part on research from the International Panel on Climate Change,
which showed that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions were contributing to climate change
and endangering the planet. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,610–12 (Dec. 15, 2009).
The IPCC appears to be a “duly constituted international agency” for the purposes of Section
115. See Burger et al., supra note 212, at 373.
228. See Burger et al., supra note 212, at 375–92 (considering whether Section 115(c)’s
reciprocity requirement is procedural or substantive and concluding that the United States’
treaties and nonbinding commitments satisfy either standard).
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Section 115. Citizens or states could petition the EPA to regulate229 and
then compel compliance using the citizen-suit provision of the Clean
Air Act.230
On the other hand, if a court hearing a federal nuisance case were
to find that neither Section 111(d) nor Section 115 addresses a given
source’s greenhouse gas emissions, then federal nuisance claims
against that source would be viable. Litigants could seek either
injunctive relief, forcing greenhouse gas emitters to reduce or eliminate
their greenhouse gases, or damages for the harms caused to them by
climate change. Because of the regulatory uncertainty and litigation
risks the federal common law entails, federal nuisance suits can be
extremely costly.231 For instance, in Kivalina, the plaintiffs, a small
village and tribe, asked for compensation for the damages to the town
caused by climate change-induced erosion, which the plaintiffs valued
in the millions of dollars.232 If instead, the litigants were a group of
coastal states or island nations asking for compensation for their lost

229. All citizens may petition agencies to undertake rulemaking under the Administrative
Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2018).
230. 42 U.S.C. § 7604. The Supreme Court has clarified that an agency’s denial of a petition
to regulate—as opposed to its decision not to bring an enforcement action—is subject to judicial
review. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527–28 (2007). Moreover, a finding that Section 115
does address greenhouse gases might open the door for foreign countries or their citizens to bring
federal nuisance claims against domestic polluters. On the other hand, it might be argued that the
United States’ international climate agreements or simply the President’s interest in diplomacy
would displace a foreign country’s nuisance claim. This presents interesting issues that are beyond
the scope of this Note. For a discussion of international transboundary pollution cases, see
generally TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL
SMELTER ARBITRATION (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006).
231. The cost and regulatory uncertainty of the federal common law have led many to criticize
the doctrine, especially the judges who are fashioning it. Judges worry that they are ill-equipped
to fashion remedies in complex areas like environmental pollution, and they are hesitant to step
on the toes of the legislature or interfere with principles of federalism. See, e.g., Milwaukee II, 451
U.S. 304, 312–14 (1981). But AEP itself reaffirmed that there has been a robust lineage of cases
that have “approved federal common-law suits brought by one State to abate pollution emanating
from another State.” 564 U.S. 410, 421 (2011). It stressed that environmental protection is
“undoubtedly an area . . . in which federal courts may fill in ‘statutory interstices,’ and, if
necessary, even ‘fashion federal law.’” Id. (quoting Friendly, supra note 36, at 421–22). Therefore,
the mere fact that federal nuisance claims are costly and engender regulatory uncertainty does
not mean that they cannot or should not be leveraged. See Louise Weinberg, Federal Common
Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 809 (1989) (finding that despite their distaste with the doctrine,
judges do in fact make federal common law and arguing that they should do so “overtly, rather
than through gratuitous rulings on the supposed infirmities of judicial federal lawmaking power”).
232. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012).
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shorelines,233 the damages could run into the tens or hundreds of
billions of dollars.234
In addition to being forced to compensate states injured by climate
change, industry actors might be persuaded by the extreme costs of
federal nuisance litigation to prefer a federal statute that displaces the
federal common law. Under this theory, the “imposition of variable,
potentially inconsistent and more costly litigation outcomes induces
industry to seek preemptive federal legislation to reign [sic] in such
costs.”235 For instance, the wave of federal environmental laws in the
late 1960s and 1970s has been attributed to industry’s efforts to
preempt the patchwork of state regulations that made regulatory
compliance much more expensive.236 In a more modern example, the
chemical industry’s surprising support for the recent Toxic Substance
Control Act amendments, which place significant burdens on the
industry, has been attributed to the industry’s preference to “operate
in a market that has regulatory certainty” by preempting state laws.237
Indeed, AEP itself was praised by industry because it was seen as
enhancing regulatory certainty. As one commentator put it: “At a time
when regulated entities decry regulatory uncertainty, the Court has
provided a clear progression for GHG regulation: expect agency action
first and then, if States or environmental groups are unhappy with
these standards, redress can be sought in the federal courts.”238
This suggests that industry would likely prefer a federal statute
addressing greenhouse gases to the litigation risk posed by the federal
common law.

233. Cf. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522 (holding that Massachusetts’ loss of coastline was
sufficient to confer standing).
234. See FRANK ACKERMAN & ELIZABETH A. STANTON, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, THE
COST OF CLIMATE CHANGE 7 (2008), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/cost.pdf [https://
perma.cc/W8FC-7CQR] (projecting sea-rise related real estate loss to cost the United States $360
billion per year annually by 2100 if global warming continues unchecked).
235. Colares & Ristovski, supra note 9, at 332.
236. Id.; see also E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory
of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326–
29 (1985).
237. Christina Valimaki, New TSCA Regulation: Benefit and Burden for the Chemical
Industry, ELSEVIER (July 7, 2016), https://chemical-materials.elsevier.com/chemical-rd/new-tscaregulation-benefit-and-burden-for-the-chemical-industry [https://perma.cc/4EQP-KGH9].
238. JENNIFER SMITH LENTO, SUPREME COURT RULES AGAINST FEDERAL COMMON LAW
NUISANCE CLAIMS BECAUSE EPA, NOT THE JUDICIARY, IS AUTHORIZED TO REGULATE
UTILITY EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES (2011), https://www.nixonpeabody.com//media/Files/Alerts/Environmental_Alert_06_22_2011.ashx [https://perma.cc/HRL7-DU9A].
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CONCLUSION
In sum, UARG demonstrates that the Clean Air Act does not
comprehensively address greenhouse gases, and therefore the
conclusion drawn from AEP—that federal nuisance claims concerning
greenhouse gases are dead and buried—is premature. Instead, a
federal nuisance claim against a given source can only be said to be
displaced if the Clean Air Act is found to provide a sufficient
framework to regulate that source’s greenhouse gas emissions.
Applying UARG’s context-specific test to the potentially applicable
sections of the Clean Air Act, it appears that only two sections of the
Clean Air Act, Sections 111(d) and 115, might address existing
stationary sources’ greenhouse gas emissions, but their coverage is
uncertain, especially because the D.C. Circuit seems increasingly
unlikely to rule on the Clean Power Plan.
In light of this uncertainty, we should toss away the obituary and
leverage federal nuisance suits against the same types of sources that
were sued in AEP. On the one hand, a nuisance suit in this context
could compel a court to clarify that either Section 111(d) or Section 115
addresses greenhouse gases, which could in turn be used to force the
EPA to develop effective and comprehensive regulations. On the other
hand, if a court were to find that no section of the Clean Air Act
addresses these sources’ greenhouse gas emissions, then the massive
litigation risk caused by federal nuisance suits could induce those
industries to ask Congress to pass legislation that comprehensively
addresses climate change and displaces the federal common law in the
process. Win or lose, reviving the federal common law of nuisance
presents a compelling opportunity to force comprehensive, federal
action to address the pressing issue of climate change.

